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INTRODUCTION

Several states recognize putative spouse status, which entitles
individuals to receive property or support when their “marriages” end,
even though those marriages were void.1 But states recognizing this status
impose various limitations on who qualifies as a putative spouse and on
the types of benefits that a putative spouse might enjoy. While states
recognizing this status employ it as an equitable remedy to prevent
unfairness and unjust enrichment, they differ in approach in ways that are
sometimes surprising and occasionally self-defeating. The doctrine needs
to be modified if fairness to the various interested parties is to be achieved.

Copyright 2021, by MARK STRASSER.
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. See Tagupa v. Tagupa, 121 P.3d 924, 926 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (“[E]ven
in cases where a putative spouse is determined to be entitled to a share of the
quasi-marital property, the marriage is nonetheless deemed to be void.”).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 127

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1236

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Part I of this Article offers some background on putative spouses. Part
II explains some of the differences among the states with respect to their
treatment of putative spouses, noting some of the competing policy
choices and, occasionally, internal inconsistencies. The Article concludes
by recommending some changes and issuing alerts about some of the
difficulties that will have to be resolved.
I. PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE
Marriages may be void for a variety of reasons ranging from a defect
in the marriage ceremony to the failure of one of the spouses to obtain a
divorce before attempting to marry again. States must decide how, if at all,
to distribute assets when a void marriage “ends,” and putative spouse
status provides a blueprint for appropriate asset distribution in particular
cases.
A. Background
Historically, putative marriages were recognized in Louisiana and
many southwestern states,2 tracing back to Spanish3 and French law.4
However, currently, states in various parts of the country recognize that
status.5

2. See In re Krone’s Est., 189 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
3. Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for
a Putative Divorce, 64 LA. L. REV. 71, 78–79 (2003) (“Under Spanish law, a
bigamous husband who died leaving both a legal and a putative spouse had to
forfeit his share of the property earned during the putative marriage to his two
wives as compensation for the grievous wrong he committed against the legal wife
and for deceiving the good faith, putative wife.”).
4. Id. at 79 (“The 1804 French Code Napoleon recognized the effects of
putative marriages.”).
5. See Leon Gabinet, Common Law and “Putative” Marriages, in TAX
ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION § 3:11.50 n.1 & 2 (2d. ed., 2019) (listing
California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Texas, and Washington); see also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d
1007, 1011 (Alaska 1995) (noting that the state recognizes putative marriages);
Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 254 P.3d 439, 449 (Haw. 2011) (same); Allen v.
Allen, 703 A.2d 1115, 1115 (R.I. 1997) (same); Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d
747, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“The courts of this state have been willing to
grant equitable relief, in certain circumstances, to putative spouses.”).
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Traditionally, a putative marriage involves two individuals who
participate in a marriage ceremony6 and then live together as a married
couple but nonetheless do not have a valid marriage because some
impediment prevented their marrying,7 e.g., one of the parties still had a
living spouse.8 An additional requirement for a putative marriage is that at
least one of the ceremony participants believed the marriage valid,9 e.g.,
one of the parties was unaware that his or her would-be spouse was already
married to someone else.10 The putative marriage ends once the
6. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) (“[T]he Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act . . . provides that an unmarried person
may acquire the rights of a legal spouse only if he goes through a marriage
ceremony and cohabits with another in the good-faith belief that he is validly
married. When he learns that the marriage is not valid his status as a putative
spouse terminates.”).
7. Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 810 (La. 1935) (“Parties may be
married and not validly married. They may have been willing to contract, agreed
to contract, and may have actually contracted pursuant to the forms and
ceremonies prescribed by law but still not be validly married because of some
legal impediment to their marriage which destroys one of the essentials to a valid
marriage, to wit, the ability to contract.”); Miller v. Johnson, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251,
253 (Ct. App. 1963) (“The usual putative marriage arises where it is solemnized
in due form and celebrated in good faith but because of some legal infirmity is
either void or voidable.”); see also Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative
Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1985) (“[M]ost states that do not
recognize common-law marriage require a marriage ceremony as a prerequisite to
a putative marriage.”). However, a different rule applies if the state recognizes
common-law marriage. See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (“A putative marriage may arise out of either a ceremonial or common
law marriage.”) (citing Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972)).
8. In re Marriage of Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 365–66 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Under the equitable putative spouse doctrine, a person's reasonable, good faith
belief that his or her marriage is valid entitles that person to the benefits of
marriage, even if the marriage is not, in fact, valid.”) (citing In re Domestic P’ship
of Ellis, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 402 (Ct. App. 2008)).
9. See Sancha v. Arnold, 251 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); see also
Casey E. Faucon, “Living Separate and Apart”: Solving the Problem of Putative
Community Property in Louisiana, 85 TUL. L. REV. 771, 828 (2011) (“The earliest
formulations of Louisiana's putative marriage rule sought to protect the rights of
the good faith putative spouse.”).
10. Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 712–13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) (writ
refused n.r.e. Apr. 1, 1970) (“Since Arcelia Lucius Caruso was innocent of
knowledge of the pre-existing marriage, she was not a meretricious spouse, but
was a putative spouse, and entitled to one-half of the ‘community’ properties
acquired by herself and Pasquale Caruso during their marriage relationship.”).
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impediment is revealed and neither of the parties believes the marriage
valid.11
Putative marriage claims arise in a variety of circumstances.
Sometimes, both parties to the marriage are laboring under a mistaken
belief that there is no impediment to their marriage. Such a
misunderstanding might arise for a number of reasons, including:
1) both parties misunderstood when one of the party’s divorce decree
was effective,12 or
2) one of the parties had reasonably relied on a former spouse’s
assertion that he or she would obtain a divorce but, for whatever
reason, that individual did not follow through,13 or

11. Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (Nev. 2004) (“[O]nce a spouse
learns of the impediment, the putative marriage ends.”); Blumenthal v. Brewer,
69 N.E. 3d 834, 853 (Ill. 2016) (“Once the putative spouse learns that the marriage
is not valid, his status as a putative spouse terminates.”).
12. Galbraith v. Galbraith, 396 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.)
(“Even though the judgment of divorce which dissolved plaintiff’s previous
marriage was rendered in open court before his purported marriage to defendant,
the judgment was not signed until after this remarriage.”), writ denied, 401 So. 2d
974 (La. 1981), and writ denied, 401 So. 2d 975 (La. 1981); id. at 1368
(“[P]laintiff’s prior marriage was not dissolved by a final judgment until the
signing of that judgment . . . .”); id. (“The trial court specifically found both
plaintiff and defendant to be in good faith and thus the annulled marriage was held
to nevertheless produce the civil effects of a valid marriage.”).
13. Neureither v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 93 Cal. Rptr. 162, 165 (Ct.
App. 1971) (“Burris, whose testimony was taken in Michigan by the insurance
carrier, verified that he did make such a telephone call from Michigan to petitioner
in California, and did tell her that he was going to obtain a divorce, but that he did
not do so.”). But see Freet v. Freet, 442 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1983) (“Gary, on the other hand, blindly relied on the assertion of his ex-wife,
who was located in Florida. He knew as late as the summer of 1967 that his
divorce proceedings had not yet begun, and then failed to check on the status of
the proceedings before his wedding in 1968.”) (emphasis added); Funderburk v.
Funderburk, 38 So. 2d 502, 504 (La. 1949) (“[T]he mere assertion by the man to
the woman that he has secured a divorce from his wife whom she knows he is
married to is not sufficient in itself to create a presumption of good faith on her
part where there are no further facts and circumstances that would lead her to
believe the man is actually divorced.”).
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3) some third party had failed to fulfill his or her responsibilities,
which meant that one of the parties did not obtain a valid
divorce.14
At other times, only one of the parties believes in the validity of the
marriage, e.g., because the other party never mentioned his or her prior
marriage, much less that it never ended through death or dissolution.15 Or,
perhaps one of the parties relies on the other’s word that his or her former

14. See, e.g., Hart v. Hart, 427 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 433 So. 2d 152 (La. 1983) (“[T]he court felt that she was relying on her
attorney there to handle the proceedings properly and therefore was in good faith
in contracting the marriage with Mr. Hart.”); Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329, 332
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984):
Gaudin explained that the Alabama lawyer had defrauded her into
believing in the validity of the divorce judgment which he had issued to
her, and that she was an easy mark for his trickery and deceit, having
only a high school education and no knowledge of divorce law.
Given the undisputed facts of this case, we are satisfied that Gaudin was
indeed an unwitting victim of deceit by her Alabama attorney, and that
Gaudin entered her marriage to Mara in the belief that her divorce from
Buglione was valid.
Thomason v. Thomason, 776 So. 2d 553 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2000) (finding that
one of the parties was a putative spouse because she had not realized that the
justice of the peace had failed to fill out the marriage license).
15. See Kindle v. Kindle, 629 So. 2d 176, 176–77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(“At the time of the purported marriage, the appellant/husband was already
married. The appellee/wife was not aware of this fact and, therefore, was an
innocent victim of the husband’s wrongdoing.”); Holcomb v. Kincaid, 406 So. 2d
650, 652 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1136 (La. 1982)
(“There is documentary proof in the record of defendant obtaining his final
divorce decree after his marriage to plaintiff. At the annulment proceeding
defendant testified he knew he was not free to marry plaintiff.”).
Some jurisdictions distinguish between cases in which the alleged putative spouse
never knew that the partner had married and cases in which the alleged putative
spouse knew of the marriage but wrongly thought that there had been a divorce.
See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (“When the
spouse is unaware of a prior undissolved marriage, good faith is presumed. [Citing
Whaley v. Peat, 377 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964.] However, when the
putative spouse is aware that a former marriage existed at one time, the question
becomes one of the reasonableness of that party’s belief that the former marriage
has been dissolved.”).
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marriage had ended in divorce,16 even though the latter party knows that
no divorce was secured.17
B. Common-Law Marriage and Putative Spouse Doctrine
Some of the states recognizing putative spouses18 refuse to recognize
common-law marriage, while others recognize both putative marriage and
common-law marriage.19 States that make a conscious decision not to
permit common-law marriages to be contracted20 within the state21 may
16. See Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587, 593 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 363 So. 2d 72 (La. 1978) (“[T]he trial judge apparently concluded,
based on a credibility determination, that Linda was not under any obligation to
investigate further Zinsel’s marital status after having been told by him that he
had been divorced. We find no error.”).
17. See Allen v. Allen, 703 A.2d 1115, 1116 (R.I. 1997) (“[T]he plaintiff’s
failure to acknowledge his prior marriage on the marriage license, his failure to
identify the date his ‘divorce’ became final, and his admission that he was married
at the time of the second marriage do not support a finding of good faith and
preclude the application of the putative spouse doctrine.”).
18. For a listing of some of those states, see sources cited supra note 5.
19. See Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (“An
informal or common-law marriage exists in Texas if the parties (1) agreed to be
married, (2) lived together in Texas as husband and wife after the agreement, and
(3) there presented to others that they were married.”); Smith v. Smith, 966 A.2d
109, 114 (R.I. 2009) (“This state recognizes common-law marriage.”) (citing
Souza v. O’Hara, 395 A.2d 1060, 1062 (R.I. 1978)); In re Est. of Ober, 62 P.3d
1114, 1115 (Mont. 2003) (“The State of Montana recognizes common-law
marriages.”); In re Est. of Little, 433 P.3d 172, 176 (Colo. App. 2018) (“In
Colorado, ‘[a] common law marriage is established by the mutual consent or
agreement of the parties to be husband and wife, followed by a mutual and open
assumption of a marital relationship.’”) (citing People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660,
663 (Colo. 1987)).
It is also true that some of the states recognizing putative spouses are common
law jurisdictions while others are community property jurisdictions. See Wallace,
supra note 3, at 77 (“The recognition of putative marriage crosses both civil and
common law lines.”).
20. See, e.g., Est. of Edgett, 168 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (Ct. App. 1980)
(“California does not accept the doctrine of common law marriage abolished in
California by statute in 1895.”) (citing Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143 (Cal. 1898));
see also Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) (“[P]ublic policy
disfavors private contractual alternatives to marriage.”).
21. States prohibiting common law marriages to be contracted within the state
may nonetheless recognize those common law marriages validly contracted
elsewhere. See Colbert v. Colbert, 169 P.2d 633, 635 (Cal. 1946) (“By this statute
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well require individuals to have participated in a marriage ceremony to
qualify as a putative spouse.22 In contrast, jurisdictions recognizing
common-law marriage will likely not impose such a requirement for
putative spouses.23 In those latter jurisdictions, because common-law
marriage is an additional, valid way to enter into a marriage, those who in
good faith attempt to enter into marriage that way but are unable to do so
because of some existing, unknown impediment24 should also qualify for
putative spouse status.25
Suppose that two individuals, Robin and Lynn, live in a state
recognizing putative but not common-law marriage. Suppose further that
they participate in a marriage ceremony before Lynn’s divorce is final.26
California recognizes common law marriages validly contracted in a sister state.”)
(citing McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936)).
22. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209–10 (noting that in the very act in which
common-law marriage was rejected the legislature recognized putative spouses
and that one of the qualifications for that status was to have participated in a
ceremonial marriage); see also Welch v. State, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430, 433 (Ct.
App. 2000), disapproved of by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211 (Cal.
2013) (“Appellant and Leonard Welch made no attempt whatsoever to comply
with the procedural requirements for a lawful California marriage. Appellant,
having been legally married and divorced twice, must have been aware of these
requirements. Further, appellant’s claim that their common law vows established
a valid marriage is unreasonable as a matter of law because California abolished
common law marriage in 1895.”).
23. Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (“A
putative marriage may arise out of either a ceremonial or common law marriage.”)
(citing Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)).
24. Cf. Dean v. Goldwire, 480 S.W.2d 494, 496–97 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972)
(writ refused n.r.e. Oct. 4, 1972) (“We hold that if either appellee or appellant
believed in good faith that she had obtained a valid Mexican divorce from Dean
and that she was therefore legally free to marry appellee at the time of their
marriage, then the marriage was putative and remained such until they both
learned that she was not divorced from Dean.”).
25. Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950) (“[E]very
reason that exists for allowing relief to a party who has entered into a putative
marriage relationship applies with equal force to the situation where the putative
marriage was entered into as a common law marriage as where it was entered into
pursuant to a marriage ceremony.”).
26. Est. of Sax, 263 Cal. Rptr. 190, 191 (Ct. App. 1989) (“Decedent’s
affidavit for final judgment of divorce from his former spouse was filed with the
court for signature on October 8, 1957. The decedent remarried that same day.
The final judgment of divorce which terminated the decedent's first marriage was
signed and entered in the judgment book of the court not on the date filed with the
court but on the following day, Oct. 9, 1957.”) (citing Dean v. Goldwire, 480
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Ceremony notwithstanding, their marriage is not valid because Lynn was
married to someone else at the time the ceremony took place.27 Robin will
likely be treated as a putative spouse,28 assuming that Robin was unaware
that Lynn’s divorce was not final when their marriage ceremony took
place.29
Suppose, instead, that Robin and Lynn live in a jurisdiction
recognizing common-law marriage. Common-law marriages may be
established when the members of the couple (1) agree to be married; (2)
live together and hold themselves out to the community as married; and
(3) are legally permitted to marry.30 Suppose further that Robin and Lynn
participate in a marriage ceremony when Lynn’s divorce is not final, they
continue living together even after Lynn’s divorce is final, and the
impediment to their marriage has been removed. Many of the commonlaw-marriage jurisdictions will recognize their marriage.31
S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972)); see also Garduno, 760 S.W.2d at 739
(“[A]ppellant’s prior marriage was an impediment to a valid common law
marriage to appellee, until the divorce became final on January 3, 1986. The
parties could still have entered a putative marriage, however, during the times that
appellee was unaware of the prior marriage or believed it had been terminated.”)
(writ refused n.r.e. Oct. 4, 1972).
27. Sax, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (“Since the judgment of divorce did not become
effective until one day following the decedent’s remarriage, the second marriage
was void.”).
28. Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329, 333 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e
conclude that Gaudin is entitled to putative status.”).
29. Id. at 333 (“Mary Ann Gaudin, at the time of her marriage to Gustave
Mara, entertained the good faith and reasonable belief that her divorce from John
P. Buglione, Jr. was final and valid.”).
30. See Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 451 (Mont. 2004)
(“Common law marriage in Montana is an equitable doctrine used to ensure
people are treated fairly once a relationship ends. Under our common law, such a
marriage is established when a couple: 1) is competent to enter into a marriage,
2) mutually consents and agrees to a common law marriage, and 3) cohabits and
is reputed in the community to be husband and wife.”) (citing In re Est. of Ober,
62 P.3d 1114, 1115 (Mont. 2003)).
31. Dowd v. Dowd, 418 A.2d 1387, 1389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (“[W]henever
one or both parties enter a matrimonial relationship in good faith, ignorant of an
impediment to a valid marriage, continued cohabitation after the impediment has
been removed results in a valid marriage.”). Some states that do not recognize
common law marriage have adopted an analogous approach via statute. See Est.
of Whyte v. Whyte, 614 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“Gloria and John’s
previously void marriage became lawful under section 212(b) because the
impediment of Gloria’s previous marriage to William was removed and the couple
subsequently cohabitated with each other.”).
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In jurisdictions that do not recognize common-law marriage, Robin
would be entitled to some benefits at the conclusion of the “marriage”
because she would be considered a putative spouse. Conversely, in a
jurisdiction that recognizes common-law marriage, Robin would be
recognized as Lynn’s common-law spouse once the impediment to
marriage was removed; therefore, there would be no need to appeal to
putative spouse status.32
By the same token, suppose that Riley and Kyle participate in a
wedding. Neither has ever been married nor is there any legal impediment
to their marriage.33 However, there is an irregularity in the ceremony that
prevents the marriage from being recognized.34 The couple nonetheless
settles down and raises a family. They treat each other as spouses and hold
themselves out to the community as spouses. Later, when Riley sues for
divorce, Kyle claims that they were never validly married. In this kind of
case, their marriage will be recognized in a jurisdiction recognizing

32. In some jurisdictions recognizing common-law marriage, mere removal
of the impediment will not automatically result in recognition of the common-law
marriage. Instead, the couple will have to do something that indicates that they
understand that they are now able to contract a common-law marriage and in fact
are doing so. See Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 314 S.E.2d 16, 19 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(“A relationship illicit at its inception does not ripen into a common law marriage
once the impediment to marriage is removed. Instead, the law presumes that the
relationship retains its illicit character after removal of the impediment. [Citing
Kirby v. Kirby, 241 S.E. 2d 415, 416 (S.C. 1978).] In order for a common law
marriage to arise, the parties must agree to enter into a common law marriage after
the impediment is removed, though such agreement may be gathered from the
conduct of the parties.”) (citing Byers v. Mt. Vernon Mills, 231 S.E.2d 699 (S.C.
1977)).
33. For example, they are not too closely related by blood. See N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (“No person shall marry his or her father, mother, father’s
brother, father’s sister, mother’s brother, mother’s sister, son, daughter, brother,
sister, son’s son, son’s daughter, daughter’s son, daughter’s daughter, brother’s
son, brother’s daughter, sister’s son, sister’s daughter, father’s brother’s son,
father’s brother’s daughter, mother’s brother’s son, mother’s brother’s daughter,
father’s sister’s son, father’s sister’s daughter, mother’s sister’s son, or mother’s
sister’s daughter. No person shall be allowed to be married to more than one
person at any given time.”).
34. Cf. Marriage of Shores v. Shores, No. A12–2245, 2014 WL 1758102, at
*4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2014) (“There is nothing in the record indicating that
respondent understood the marriage to be invalid because the person who signed
the marriage certificate was not the person who performed the marriage
ceremony.”).
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common-law marriage.35 However, in a jurisdiction not recognizing
common-law marriage, they will not have a valid marriage,36 which may
mean that the protections for Riley will instead arise by virtue of Riley
being a putative spouse.37

35. Fisher v. Fisher, 243 P. 730, 730 (Okla. 1925) (“There is evidence from
which it might be concluded that the plaintiff in error induced the defendant in
error to go through a marriage ceremony, which she believed to be valid, but
which, in fact, was invalid, for the reason that plaintiff in error had not secured a
license.”); id. at 730–31 (“These facts and circumstances constituted a commonlaw marriage, valid in this state.”).
36. Some states not recognizing common-law marriage nonetheless provide
a statutory method to validate such marriages. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
207, § 6 (West 2020) (“If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with
whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract with
due legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and
wife, and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one of the parties
in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, that the
former marriage had been annulled by a divorce, or without knowledge of such
former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has been
removed by the death or divorce of the other party to the former marriage, if they
continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of
them, be held to have been legally married from and after the removal of such
impediment, and the issue of such subsequent marriage shall be considered as the
legitimate issue of both parents.”).
Pennsylvania no longer recognizes common-law marriages and now has a statute
addressing this issue. See 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West
2020) (“If a married person, during the lifetime of the other person with whom
the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage pursuant to the
requirements of this part and the parties to the marriage live together thereafter as
husband and wife, and the subsequent marriage was entered into by one or both
of the parties in good faith in the full belief that the former spouse was dead or
that the former marriage has been annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without
knowledge of the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their
marriage has been removed by the death of the other party to the former marriage
or by annulment or divorce, if they continue to live together as husband and wife
in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from
and immediately after the date of death or the date of the decree of annulment or
divorce.”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(b) (West 2020) (“Parties to a
marriage prohibited under subsection (a) of this Section who cohabit after removal
of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the
impediment.”).
37. See Shores, 2014 WL 1758102, at *4.
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In the above examples, there is no need for putative spouse status in
the jurisdictions recognizing common-law marriage.38 However, a change
in the facts illustrates why the recognition of putative marriage may be
important in a jurisdiction recognizing common-law marriage.
Suppose that Lynn and Robin participate in a marriage ceremony, but
the marriage is not valid because Lynn’s divorce is not final. Suppose
further that, unbeknownst to Robin, Lynn’s divorce is never final.39 In that
event, Robin will never become Lynn’s common-law spouse, because they
will never have been legally permitted to marry. Unless there is putative
spouse status, Robin might be viewed as a legal stranger to Lynn.40
Recognition of putative spouse status in common-law-marriage
jurisdictions provides protection for the innocent spouse where the
marriage can never be recognized because the impediment continues to
exist.41 Thus, while putative spouse status fills some gaps in states not
recognizing common-law marriage that need not be filled in states
recognizing common-law marriage,42 putative spouse status does fill gaps
even in jurisdictions recognizing common-law marriage.43
38. See Hon. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon over for Common-Law
Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law
Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 399, 421 n.123 (1999) (“Alabama does not
apply the putative spouse doctrine, apparently because those persons whose
marriage fails to comply with the requirements of a valid ceremonial marriage can
be found to have entered into a common-law marriage.”).
39. Cf. Gill v. Brickman, 274 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (“[I]t was shown
by affidavits that a search of the records of New York county failed to disclose
divorce proceedings between Dalka Gill and George Gill; that the National
Desertion Bureau in New York endeavored to locate him and ascertained that he
left his employment in Brooklyn on December 5, 1930, and reported they were
unable to locate him; that a search of the records in Los Angeles and San Diego
counties failed to disclose divorce proceedings between Dalka Gill and George
Gill.”).
40. See Julie Greenberg et. al., Beyond the Binary: What Can Feminists Learn
from Intersex and Transgender Jurisprudence?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 22
(2010) (“[O]ne of the parties who, perhaps, has all of the property in his or her
name seeks to avoid a property division or being forced to pay spousal support by
claiming that the marriage was void ab initio.”).
41. Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950) (writ refused
n.r.e. Jan. 19, 1951) (“[E]very reason that exists for allowing relief to a party who
has entered into a putative marriage relationship applies with equal force to the
situation where the putative marriage was entered into as a common law marriage
as where it was entered into pursuant to a marriage ceremony.”).
42. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
43. But see Beatrice K. Sowald, Putative Marriage, in BALDWIN’S OHIO
PRACTICE DOMESTIC RELATIONS Law § 2:50, Westlaw OHPRAC DOM R § 2:50
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In effect, states recognizing common-law marriage and states not
recognizing common-law marriage use analogous approaches when
deciding whether an individual qualifies for putative spouse status. Where
the parties to the putative marriage utilize an accepted method of
establishing a marriage and at least one of the parties believes in good faith
that the marriage is valid, the “innocent” individual44 may be treated as a
putative spouse if there were some legal impediment to the marriage. That
individual would be entitled to at least some of the benefits that are
accorded to those in valid marriages, although the particular benefits will
vary depending upon local law.
In a state known not to recognize common-law marriage, the trier of
fact may simply disbelieve an individual claiming a sincere belief in the
validity of her marriage by private agreement.45 States recognizing
putative spouse status require a sincere belief in the validity of the
marriage,46 so an individual without such a belief will not qualify as a
putative spouse.47
(“A putative (or reputed) marriage is the standard equitable device used in those
states that do not recognize common law marriages and have no other way to
satisfactorily determine property division, probate claims of the (reputed)
surviving spouse, etc.”).
44. See In re Marriage of Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 365 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may
be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine.”) (citing Est. of DePasse,
118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 155 (Ct. App. 2002)).
45. So, too, individuals might simply be disbelieved if claiming to have had
a sincere belief in the validity of their marriage, notwithstanding their failure to
divorce a prior spouse. See Combs v. Tibbits, 148 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo. App.
2006) (“[A]t all times, both parties knew that plaintiff was legally married to
another person throughout the period of his cohabitation with
defendant. . . . Neither plaintiff nor defendant had a good faith belief that the two
were validly married, and neither qualifies as a putative spouse.”) (citing People
v. McGuire, 751 P.2d 1011 (Colo. App. 1987)); see also Rebouche v. Anderson,
505 So. 2d 808, 811 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.) (“The trial court found that plaintiff
did not possess the requisite good faith in contracting the marriage with Rebouche
that would entitle her to be recognized as Rebouche’s putative spouse. . . . [B]ased
on the evidence presented . . . plaintiff did not possess a reasonable belief that she
was divorced from Ramsey at the time she purportedly married Rebouche.”), writ
denied, 507 So. 2d 228 (La. 1987).
46. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 6 (“The putative marriage doctrine is a device
developed to ameliorate or correct the injustice which would occur if civil effects
were not allowed to flow to a party to a null marriage who believes in good faith
that he or she is validly married.”).
47. See Miller v. Johnson, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1963) (“Here, the
farcical solemnization of divorce and marriage fails to meet any tests and negates
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II. VARIATIONS IN STATE PUTATIVE SPOUSE APPROACHES
States as a general matter employ putative spouse status to protect
individuals who sincerely believed their void marriages valid, although the
states are by no means uniform with respect to which benefits may be
accorded, how the benefits should be distributed, or even what standard
should be used to determine whether an individual qualifies as a putative
spouse.48 Some of the differences among the states are readily understood
in terms of other policy choices, while other differences are less readily
explained and seem to undercut the state’s policy commitments. Several
states should reconsider their approaches to putative spouses.
A. Which Benefits Do Putative Spouses Enjoy?
Courts offer a few justifications for recognizing a putative spouse. A
couple might have lived together for years and worked hard to build a
business or acquire assets,49 and it would be unfair not to permit the
putative spouse to enjoy the fruits of his or her labor.50 In addition, refusing
good faith.”); id. (“The trial court found that plaintiff not only failed to prove a
divorce from her former husband, but failed to prove either a valid or a putative
marriage to Mr. Miller. These findings are well supported by the evidence.”).
48. Compare Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Nev. 2004)
(“[A]bsent fraud, the doctrine does not apply to awards of spousal support.”), with
Smithers v. Smithers, 804 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“[A] trial
court may award temporary alimony and attorney's fees to a putative spouse, even
when she is the wrongdoer.”), and In re Parental Resps. Concerning D.P.G., 472
P.3d 567, 571 (Colo App. 2020) (“A putative spouse has the same rights as a legal
spouse, including the right to maintenance.”).
49. Combs, 148 P.3d at 431 (“In addition to their domestic relationship, the
parties were also involved in a business that sold vitamins and herbal extracts.”);
Est. of Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 (Ct. App. 1974) (“Throughout the years
Josephine continued to perform secretarial work for Juan’s business at home
without pay.”).
50. See Brennfleck v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 84 Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (Ct.
App. 1970) (“There is a fundamental unfairness in treating such a putative wife
who has reason to believe and in good faith believes that she is the workmen's
wife, as does he, differently from a legal wife. The putative wife has contributed
equally as much as the legal wife in preparing the workmen's meals, encouraging
him in his work and generally enabling him to carry on.”); Est. of Levie, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 445, 447 (Ct. App. 1975) (discussing the “equities connected with property
acquired during the putative marriage . . . [where] the joint efforts of the putative
spouses . . . contribute to the acquisition of . . . property”), disapproved of on other
grounds by Est. of Leslie, 689 P.2d 133 (Cal. 1984); Sancha v. Arnold, 251 P.2d
67, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (“The decedent had agreed with respondent that if and
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to recognize a person’s putative spouse status would seem unfair, because
an individual would then not be entitled to the benefits that he or she had
expected in good faith.51 The California Supreme Court explained that “the
fundamental purpose of the putative spouse doctrine was to protect the
expectations of innocent parties and to achieve results that are equitable,
fair, and just.”52
While both of these rationales support dividing property acquired
through joint efforts,53 states disagree about which marital benefits should
be accorded to a putative spouse. Even states permitting the “civil effects
of a marriage to flow in favor of the party who marries in good faith as
though the marriage had been legally contracted”54 may disagree about
which civil effects should be included.55 For example, protecting the
innocent party’s expectations would support ordering spousal support in
when he died the property he agreed to acquire and in the use of which she agreed
to toil, together with what earnings the two could so accumulate, would belong to
her. There can in equity be no just result save a decree specifically enforcing the
agreement made.”).
51. In re Est. of Chen, No. B182317, 2006 WL 1545714, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 7, 2006) (“Putative spouse status may also be based on the good faith
reasonable expectations of the parties.”); Blakesley, supra note 7, at 41 (“[T]he
trend in the United States appears to be to allow support when equity requires it
in order to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties.”).
52. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2013).
53. See In re Marriage of Tejada, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 366 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Quasi-marital property is ‘property acquired during the union which would have
been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been
void or voidable’ [citing Est. of Leslie, 689 P.2d 133, 136 n.5 (Cal. 1984)]. . . .
Upon declaration of putative spouse status, the court is required to divide the
quasi-marital property as if it were community property.”) (citing Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 n.13 (Cal. 1976)).
54. In re Koonce, 380 So. 2d 140, 142 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ
denied sub nom., Application of Koonce, 383 So. 2d 23 (La. 1980).
55. Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (Nev. 2004) (“States
differ . . . on what exactly constitutes a ‘civil effect.’”); see also Wallace, supra
note 3, at 74 (“[S]tates that recognize the rule disagree on the breadth of effects
that a putative spouse can receive.”). For example, one issue is whether the
putative spouse then has the ability to adopt as a stepparent. Koonce, 380 So. 2d
at 142 (“We also find that appellant’s status as a ‘spouse’ was a civil effect in his
favor at the time of the adoption which entitled him to obtain a final adoption
decree at the first hearing.”). Apparently, Koonce did not view this as a benefit—
he was seeking to have the adoption annulled. See id. at 141 (“Mr. Koonce
obtained a judgment declaring his marriage to Mrs. Anderson an absolute nullity
and holding Mrs. Anderson to be in legal bad faith. Shortly thereafter, he filed a
petition for annulment of the adoption decree.”).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 140

5/26/21 11:50 AM

2021]

FAIRNESS AND THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE

1249

appropriate cases,56 but jurisdictions differ with respect to the conditions,
if any, under which spousal support might be ordered. Some jurisdictions
permit support as a matter of statute,57 others do not permit permanent
support to be awarded,58 and still others only permit permanent support
upon a showing of fraud.59
Consider benefits other than property and support; for example, the
right not to testify against one’s spouse. States have been unwilling to
extend that right to the putative spouse.60 Ironically, the failure to
recognize the testimonial privilege in the putative marriage context might
mean that the innocent spouse who wrongly believes that there is a valid
marriage might detrimentally rely upon the privilege to reveal a great deal
to his or her partner,61 whereas the party who knows that the marriage is
not valid might be less forthcoming.62 Further, the benefits of recognizing
56. But see infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
57. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1130, 1130 n.27 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 2254
(West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14–2–111 (West 2003); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/305 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (West 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–1–404 (2003)) (“Although some states permit the award
of alimony, they do so because their annulment statutes permit an award of
rehabilitative or permanent alimony.”).
58. See Whitebird v. Luckey, 67 P.2d 775, 777 (Okla. 1937) (“A court cannot
say without an unpardonable degree of inconsistency, ‘This marriage contract
being void or voidable is hereby set aside,’ and, in the next breath, ‘the contract
is valid and enforceable and by reason of its validity and enforceability, it will be
enforced to the extent of requiring the payment of alimony.’”).
59. See Williams, 97 P.3d at 1126 (“[A]bsent fraud, the doctrine does not
apply to awards of spousal support.”).
60. See Weaver v. State, 855 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(“Absent proof of a ceremonial or common law marriage recognized as a legal
marriage by the law of this state, we hold that the privilege not to testify against
one’s spouse does not extend to putative marriages.”); Est. of Edgett, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 686, 688 (Ct. App. 1980) (“[T]he marital communication privilege is
extended only to persons who have a valid marriage.”) (citing People v. Delph,
156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424 (Ct. App. 1979)).
61. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494, 501 (Mo. 1984) (“This privilege is
intended to encourage full disclosure and trust between the parties to a marriage.”)
(citing State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173, 175–76 (Mo. 1979)).
62. Were the fear that recognizing the privilege would prevent a wronged
spouse from testifying against the other spouse, that worry could be met either by
specifying who owns the privilege, see LA. CODE EVID. art. 505 (“In a criminal
case or in commitment or interdiction proceedings, a witness spouse has a
privilege not to testify against the other spouse. This privilege terminates upon the
annulment of the marriage, legal separation, or divorce of the spouses.”), or by
providing an exception when one spouses wishes to testify against the other
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the privilege, e.g., promoting the parties’ honesty and forthrightness,63
might not be realized, which would mean that the relationship that may
not have started out well (because of the existing legal impediment to the
marriage) might be further weakened because of the lack of support for
honesty and trust that would have been provided by recognition of the
privilege in this context.64
B. Was the Marriage Void or Voidable at Its Inception?
Jurisdictions vary with respect to what is necessary for an individual
to qualify as a putative spouse. Some states require that an individual
participate in a ceremony yielding a marriage that is void or voidable at
the outset,65 whereas others do not. These limitations may undermine the
state’s ability to achieve its goals of fairness and the protection of
reasonable expectations.
The paradigmatic putative marriage involves two individuals who
participated in a ceremony that yielded a void marriage because one of the

spouse with respect to harms allegedly perpetrated against the testifying spouse.
See TEX. RULES OF EVID. HANDBOOK Rule 504(4)(C) (2020 ed.) (“This privilege
does not apply: In a: (i) proceeding in which a party is accused of conduct that, if
proved, is a crime against the person of the other spouse, any member of the
household of either spouse, or any minor child; or (ii) criminal proceeding
involving a charge of bigamy under Section 25.01 of the Penal Code.”).
63. See Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1019 (Ind. App. 1979) (“The
privilege is based on strong public policy grounds which ‘favors the promotion
and preservation of marital confidences, even at the expense, in certain instances,
of depriving honest causes of upright testimony.’”) (citing Shepherd v. State, 277
N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 1971)).
64. Cf. People v. Trzeciak, 5 N.E.3d 141, 149–50 (Ill. 2013) (noting that the
privilege “is intended to further marital harmony, mutual understanding and trust
by encouraging full disclosure, free communication, and confidential
communications between spouses”) (citing People v. Simpson, 350 N.E.2d 517,
524 (Ill. App. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 369 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 1977)).
65. See Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Nev. 2004) (“Under the
doctrine, an individual whose marriage is void due to a prior legal impediment is
treated as a spouse so long as the party seeking equitable relief participated in the
marriage ceremony with the good-faith belief that the ceremony was legally
valid.”); see also Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 853 (Ill. 2016) (noting
that “the Illinois legislature adopted the civil-law concept of the putative spouse,
which involves a situation where a person goes through a marriage ceremony and
cohabits with another in the good-faith belief that he or she is validly married”)
(citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979)).
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parties was still married to someone else.66 Yet, an individual might
sincerely but falsely believe that she is married for a reason other than
having participated in such a ceremony. Suppose, for example, that a
couple validly marries and then divorces.67 However, one of the parties to
the marriage does not understand or appreciate that the parties have
divorced68 and continues to live with her former spouse,69 with the former
spouse contributing to the belief that the couple is still married.70 The
Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that “[a] plausible argument can be
made that putative spouse principles should be applied in the circumstance
where one lives with a former spouse in the good faith belief that their
valid marriage has not been dissolved,”71 and also recognized that some
other jurisdictions had recognized putative spouse status under analogous
circumstances.72 Nonetheless, because the couple had never participated
in a ceremony yielding a void or voidable marriage, the Nebraska court

66. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1999, 2016 (2017) (“A paradigmatic example is when one spouse believes that
she has successfully terminated a previous marriage but in fact has not.”).
67. Manker v. Manker, 644 N.W.2d 522, 527 (Neb. 2002) (“The parties were
married in Kearney, Nebraska, on September 4, 1979.”); id. at 528 (“On May 8,
James and his counsel appeared at the final hearing, but Karen did not appear
personally or through counsel. The district court ordered the marriage dissolved
after finding it to be irretrievably broken and then accepted the parties' property
settlement agreement and incorporated it in the decree.”).
68. Id. at 528–29 (“Karen further testified that sometime between April and
June 1980, James informed her that he had, in fact, dismissed the divorce
proceedings on the day after the parties signed the property settlement
agreement.”); id. at 529 (“Karen testified that she had no reason to suspect her
marriage to James had been dissolved until James made a suspicious comment
during an argument in 1994. Based on this comment, Karen consulted an attorney
who made inquiries and confirmed that the decree had, in fact, been entered in
1980. Karen testified that she was ‘shocked’ to learn of this fact.”).
69. Id. at 528 (“Notwithstanding the legal dissolution of their marriage,
James and Karen continued to reside together and hold themselves out as husband
and wife.”).
70. Id. (“James and Karen continued to reside together and hold themselves
out as husband and wife.”).
71. Id. at 533.
72. Id. at 532 (discussing In re Marriage of Monti, 185 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Ct. App.
1982) in which a court had “applied California's putative spouse statute in a
circumstance where the parties were both lawfully married and then lawfully
divorced, but the woman continued living with the man based upon his
representation that the divorce was never finalized”).
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rejected that the putative spouse doctrine was applicable,73 although the
court did approve the division of property as a matter of equity.74
C. The Sincerity of Belief
One issue involves whether the person participated in a ceremony
yielding a void marriage.75 A separate issue involves how the jurisdiction
determines whether the individual had a good faith belief in the validity of
her marriage; for example, whether the jurisdiction requires that the good
faith belief be “reasonable.”76
The reasonableness requirement77 is itself ambiguous—it might
involve whether an objective, informed individual would have a similar
belief,78 or it might instead involve whether it was credible (i.e., reasonable
to believe) that this particular person subjectively believed in the validity
of the marriage.79 Depending upon the individual’s “background and
73. Id. at 533. But see In re Marriage of Monti, 185 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (Ct.
App. 1982) (“[T]he Family Law Act and specifically section 4452, must be
interpreted to include as a putative spouse a divorced spouse who continues to
live with the ex-spouse in ignorance of the final divorce decree and with a good
faith belief in the continuing validity of the marriage.”).
74. Manker, 644 N.W.2d at 528.
75. See supra note 59.
76. See Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (Nev. 2004) (“‘Good faith’
has been defined as an ‘honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid
at the time of the ceremony.’”) (citing Hicklin v. Hicklin, 509 N.W.2d 627, 631
(Neb. 1994)).
77. See Mara v. Mara, 513 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987)
(“A good faith putative spouse is one who has an honest, reasonable belief that
the marriage confected is valid.”) (citing Zanders v. Zanders, 434 So. 2d 1213
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983)).
78. See Vryonis v. Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 813 (Ct. App. 1988) (“A
proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a
reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a valid
marriage.”), overruled by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 213 (Cal.
2013); Fonss v. DeMartini, No. A11–1660, 2012 WL 1658926, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 14, 2012) (distinguishing between a good faith and a reasonable belief
because the former unlike the latter is subjective); see also Choa Yang Xiong v.
Su Xiong, 800 N.W.2d 187, 191–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“We reject Xiong’s
argument because in Minnesota, ‘good faith’ is judged subjectively, while
‘reasonable belief’ is judged objectively. The plain language of section 518.055
requires only a ‘good faith belief,’ not a ‘reasonable belief.’”) (citing Bahr v.
Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. 2010)).
79. Rebouche v. Anderson, 505 So. 2d 808, 812 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987)
(“Although the good faith analysis incorporates the objective elements of
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experience,”80 what she sincerely believed may not correspond with what
the reasonable, informed person would have believed.81
If a state imposes an objective requirement, then an individual,
because of misinformation, naivety, or ignorance, might not be found to
have a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage and thus might be
left with nothing after having been in a relationship for years.82 This might
seem especially unfair if the other party in effect receives a reward for his
or her having deceived the inexperienced, former partner. Ironically, in a
case recognizing that the Louisiana test is subjective, an appellate court
upheld a lower court determination that the plaintiff’s subjective belief in
her marriage was not reasonable, notwithstanding that “the plaintiff ha[d]
a
sixth
grade
education
and
[was]
below
normal
intelligence . . . [with] . . . a mental age of 12 years.”83 In contrast, a
Minnesota court upheld a lower court finding that an individual had a
subjective, good faith belief in the validity of her marriage,
notwithstanding her having been told by her husband’s actual spouse that
he had never obtained a divorce.84

reasonableness, the inquiry is essentially a subjective one.”); see also Hart v. Hart,
427 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (“Thus the good faith analysis
called for in this context—although incorporating objective elements of
reasonableness—is essentially a subjective one.”).
80. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 213 (Cal. 2013).
81. Id. (“The good faith inquiry, however, does not call for application of a
reasonable person test, and a belief in the validity of a marriage need not be
objectively reasonable.”).
82. Cf. Monica Hof Wallace, A Primer on Marriage in Louisiana, 64 LOY.
L. REV. 557, 599 (2018) (“A spouse in bad faith at inception of the putative
marriage will not receive a share of the putative community at death or divorce.”).
83. Rebouche, 505 So. 2d at 810.
84. See Fonoti v. Fonoti, No. A17–0091, 2018 WL 2187358, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 14, 2018) (”[T]they received a phone call in 1991 from appellant’s
‘former’ wife, Beulah Fonoti, in which Beulah asserted that appellant’s prior
marriage to her was not dissolved. But respondent testified that she retained her
good-faith belief in the legality of her marriage even after this phone call, telling
appellant to ‘take care of it,’ which, in her view, meant that he should resolve any
potential impediments to the otherwise legal status of their marriage.”); id. at *2
(“The district court also considered and rejected the notion that the assertion by
Beulah extinguished respondent’s good-faith belief by providing respondent with
knowledge that she was not legally married to appellant.”); id. at *4 (Ross, J.,
dissenting) (“Today’s majority opinion distinguishes Minnesota as the first state
in the union, and I expect last state, to dispose of the presumption that everyone
knows she cannot marry an already-married man.”).
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A state employing a subjective test may have some difficulty in
justifying a requirement that the putative spouse meet a formal
requirement such as participating in a marriage ceremony. An individual
might not know that it is necessary to participate in a ceremony to have a
valid marriage, e.g., because a cousin had a valid marriage (perhaps in
another jurisdiction) without a ceremony.85 So, too, while an individual
might be aware of certain facts (e.g., that the person he or she just married
had never obtained a divorce), the individual might not understand the
significance of those facts86 and might sincerely believe in the validity of
the recent marriage.
While it is possible that someone might not be aware of the
requirement that an individual end his or her first marriage before
beginning another,87 it seems likely that most people would understand
that they cannot marry someone who is already married and that they will
not be permitted to benefit from such a bigamous marriage.88 As a practical
A separate question is whether the defendant believed the wife’s claim that her
marriage had never been dissolved. See id. at *2 (“Respondent . . . apparently
chose to reject the assertion of Beulah.”).
85. Compare Brigham v. John Herlihy, No. B178515, 2006 WL 92825, at *2
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2006) (“Herlihy was aware of a license requirement, but
chose not to obtain one. He asked the pastor whether he would be willing to
perform the ceremony without a license, and the pastor agreed. Herlihy did not
have a reasonable good faith belief in a valid marriage. The trial court properly
ruled that he cannot be considered a putative spouse.”), with Wagner v. Cty. of
Imperial, 193 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Ct. App. 1983) (“To establish she was Clifton’s
putative spouse . . . Sharon was not required to show she and Clifton participated
in a solemnization ceremony. . . . Sharon must only prove she had a good faith
belief her marriage to Clifton was valid; solemnization would be at most evidence
of such good faith belief.”).
86. Marriage of Shores v. Shores, No. A12–2245, 2014 WL 1758102, at *4
(Minn Ct. App. May 5, 2014) (“The record reflects that respondent admitted that
the individual who signed the marriage certificate as the person who performed
the marriage ceremony was not the person or persons who actually performed the
ceremony. . . . There is nothing in the record indicating that respondent
understood the marriage to be invalid because the person who signed the marriage
certificate was not the person who performed the marriage ceremony. Instead, as
the district court found, respondent ‘had a good faith belief that she was legally
married’ to appellant.”).
87. See Mark Strasser, Loving Revisionism: On Restricting Marriage and
Subverting the Constitution, 51 HOW. L. J. 75, 115 n.93 (2007) (“[A] married
individual must divorce before she can remarry.”).
88. See Endres v. Grove, 111 A.2d 638, 639–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1955)
(“[R]elief will not be granted where the claimant is shown to have known of the
impediment when he entered into the marriage sought to be adjudged void.”);
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matter, it may be that determining whether someone is a putative spouse
in light of a subjective standard (incorporating reasonableness)89 will pick
out the same people as would have been selected in light of an objective
standard. The trier of fact might reject that the purported putative spouse
actually believed in the validity of the marriage when an objectively
reasonable person never would have believed in that marriage’s validity.90
Nonetheless, the implications of the subjective standard may not be
fully appreciated. Consider the requirement that at least one of the
marriage participants believe the marriage valid when the ceremony takes
place.91 Imposing such a requirement is difficult to justify when the
individuals later sincerely believe their marriage valid because the former
impediment no longer exists. In some jurisdictions, such a belief is
objectively reasonable, both because some states recognize common-law

Baker v. Baker, 23 N.W.2d 582, 583 (Minn. 1946) (citing In re Brenchley’s Est.,
164 P. 913 (Wash. 1917)) (“The lower court found that plaintiff knew of
defendant’s prior marriage at the time the alleged common-law marriage
commenced . . . . Where the arrangement under which the parties lived together
was a meretricious one, the court will grant no relief.”).
89. Cf. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 215 (Cal. 2013)
(“[T]he reasonableness of the claimed belief is properly considered as part of the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether the belief was genuinely and
honestly held.”).
90. In Rebouche v. Anderson, the trial court suggested that it was not
reasonable for plaintiff to have relied on her husband’s obtaining the divorce,
given that she did not trust him. See 505 So. 2d 808, 811 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1987). But it might have been reasonable to believe that he would get the divorce
even if it would not be reasonable to believe that he would do other things.
Further, because the court should have used the subjective standard, the correct
question was whether she trusted him to do this (so that they would be divorced),
even though a more experienced person would not have trusted him.
91. Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1997) (“Allowing a person
who knowingly enters into a bigamous marriage to claim later he or she eventually
developed a good faith belief in the validity of that marriage would vitiate this
purpose. The better rule, in light of reason and policy, is to require good faith at
the inception of the putative marriage.”).
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marriage92 and because other states prohibiting common-law marriage93
will validate marriages after removal of the impediment. But if an
individual knows that her aunt’s marriage was validated after removal of
the impediment, that person might not appreciate that her own state does
not validate marriages under those conditions. Suggesting that she should
have known about her own state’s law or, perhaps, should have found out
what the law was would involve using an objective rather than a subjective
standard.
In states where the standard is subjective, the trier of fact may well
take into account how the person acted after the ceremony in order to
assess whether the person sincerely believed that he or she was married.94
But individuals who did not meet the state’s formal requirements might
nonetheless act in ways strongly supporting their sincere belief that they
had valid marriages.
Consider Hewitt v. Hewitt,95 which involved a couple who met while
they were both students in Iowa,96 a state which recognizes common-law
marriage.97 Victoria Hewitt became pregnant, and Robert Hewitt allegedly
said that they were husband and wife and did not need a formal ceremony
92. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Removal of Impediment to Marriage as Creating
Valid Common-Law Marriage, 52 AM. JUR. 2D MARRIAGE § 46 (May 2020
Update) (“In the states recognizing common-law marriages, persons who are
living together in a relationship that would be a valid marriage except for the
existence of an impediment precluding them from lawful matrimony, such as an
existing undissolved marriage, acquire a valid marital status automatically,
without any further ceremony or marriage agreement, when the impediment to
their marriage is removed . . . .”).
93. See supra note 36 (listing some states not recognizing common law
marriage that validate a marriage when the impediment is removed and the couple
remains together a marriage might be validated once the impediment has been
removed).
94. See, e.g., Funderburk v. Funderburk, 38 So. 2d 502, 505 (La. 1949)
(“[I]mmediately after the marriage she and the decedent returned to the Pineville
home and from that day until the day of his death some 12 years later they
continued to live there as man and wife, during which time she not only went by
the name of Mrs. Henry Edward Funderburk but was recognized and accepted as
his legal and lawful wife throughout the community. She kept house for him, she
nursed and cared for him, and she raised his children by his former
marriage . . . .”).
95. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
96. Id. at 1205.
97. See Conklin by Johnson-Conklin v. MacMillan Oil Co., 557 N.W.2d 102,
104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“Iowa recognizes the validity of common-law
marriages.”) (citing In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1970)).
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to be married.98 They then held themselves out to the community,
including their respective parents, as husband and wife.99 The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that the Hewitts would have had a common-law
marriage prior to 1905, when Illinois prohibited such marriages.100
It is simply unclear whether the Hewitts lived together in Iowa before
moving back to Illinois.101 If they did not, then they would not have met
one of the necessary elements needed to establish a common-law marriage
in Iowa.102 Further, even if the Hewitts had lived together in Iowa and met
the criteria for common-law marriage, a separate question was whether the
Hewitts had been domiciled in Iowa at the time.103 If at the time their
domicile was Illinois rather than Iowa because they always had the
intention of returning to Illinois after finishing their Iowa schooling, 104
then the law of their domicile, Illinois, would be applied to determine
whether they had a common-law marriage.105 Because Illinois did not

98. See Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 1210 (“Plaintiff’s allegations disclose a relationship that clearly
would have constituted a valid common law marriage in this State prior to 1905.”).
101. The trial suggested that the couple had not lived together in Iowa. See
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (“The trial
court . . . found that plaintiff conceded that . . . the parties had never lived together
in the State of Iowa and that there was no common law marriage which the court
might recognize.”), rev’d, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979), and overruled by Jarrett
v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979).
102. Conklin by Johnson-Conklin, 557 N.W.2d at 105 (“The three elements
necessary to find a common-law marriage are: (1) present intent and agreement
to be married; (2) continuous cohabitation; and (3) public declaration that the
parties are husband and wife.”) (citing In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d
505, 510 (Iowa 1979)).
103. See Bourelle v. Soo-Crete, Inc., 87 N.W.2d 371, 377–78 (Neb. 1958)
(suggesting that the couple had established a common law marriage in Iowa
because they had been domiciled there); see also Est. of Loewenstein v. Bombeck,
No. A-90-913, 1992 WL 174736, at *2 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (“[I]n the case cited
by Welsh, Bourelle v. Soo-Crete, Inc., . . . the parties changed their residence or
domicile to the State of Iowa, where common-law marriages were valid.”).
104. Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 834–35 (D.C. 2012) (“To satisfy
domicile, a person must establish: ‘(1) physical presence and (2) an intent to
abandon the former domicile and remain [at the new location] for an indefinite
period of time; a new domicile comes into being when the two elements
coexist.’”) (quoting Heater v. Heater, 155 A.2d 523, 524 (D.C. 1959)).
105. See Mark Strasser, Marriage, Domicile, and the Constitution, 15 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 134–35 (2020) (discussing the importance of the
Hewitts having been domiciled in Illinois).
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permit common-law marriages to be contracted,106 here was yet another
reason that they did not have a valid marriage.
One question involves the intricacies of Iowa and Illinois law with
respect to the conditions under which common-law marriages will be
recognized. 107 A different question involves what either of the Hewitts
sincerely and reasonably believed. They might well have known other
individuals in Iowa who had established common-law marriages and
might not have known about the legal requirements of cohabitation or
domicile.108 Nor would they likely have known about their need to validate
their marriage via a marriage ceremony once they returned to Illinois after
Robert had obtained his college degree. It might be very difficult to reject
that Victoria had a reasonable, good faith belief that she and Robert were
married.
Suppose that a state’s sole goal is to promote fairness in its putative
spouse policy. Even so, a state might have some difficulty in deciding
whether to accord putative status to someone merely because that person
subjectively believes that he or she is married to someone else.109
Individuals may have a variety of sincere beliefs, and recognizing an
individual’s putative spouse status because of that person’s sincere beliefs
will have important implications for other interested, innocent parties, e.g.,
the legal spouse, children from any number of relationships, and other
relatives. To make fashioning the optimal policy even more difficult, the
state will likely want to promote other interests in addition to fairness, e.g.,

106. See text accompanying supra note 100 (noting that Illinois refused to
recognize common-law marriages starting in 1905).
107. See supra notes 94–106 and accompanying text.
108. Cf. Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266, 271 (S.C. 2019) (“A party is not
required to show his opponent had legal knowledge of common-law
marriage . . . . He must demonstrate that both he and his partner mutually intended
to be married to one another, regardless of whether they knew their resident state
recognized common-law marriage or what was required to constitute one.”), reh’g
denied (Oct. 16, 2019).
109. Cf. Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 85 (1991) (“The concept of
fairness is just as elusive in family law. What is considered fair is inevitably quite
subjective.”).
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promote clarity about who is married and who is not, 110 or about who owns
and is entitled to alienate which property.111
One of the reasons that individuals have a void marriage from the
outset is that one of the parties to the marriage did not validly divorce a
previous spouse. States have differing policies with respect to the
conditions under which one can divorce one’s current spouse.112 In
addition, there are rules specifying the conditions under which a divorce
secured in one state will be recognized in another state.113 But a reasonable
person without legal training would not know these rules, and the state
must decide who will bear the burden when the relevant rules have not
been followed.
Suppose that an individual goes to Mexico so that she can divorce her
husband and marry her paramour. One question is whether she sincerely
believes that she can end one marriage and enter into another so easily.
Another question is whether a reasonable person would have believed that
such a divorce and remarriage would be legally valid. Some courts reject
110. See Stone, 833 S.E.2d at 296 (arguing that where common-law marriage
is permitted, the “solemn institution of marriage is thereby reduced to a guessing
game with significant ramifications for the individuals involved, as well as any
third party dealing with them”).
111. Cf. Donnelly v. Nolan, 15 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Iowa 1944) (“[T]he claimed
common law marriage, as asserted by the defendant, causes a cloud on the title to
the property involved in plaintiff’s action.”).
112. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(J) (West 2020) (“The court
of common pleas may grant divorces . . . . On the application of either party, when
husband and wife have, without interruption for one year, lived separate and apart
without cohabitation.”), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 103(1) (2018) (“Except in the
case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse
upon proof that . . . [t]he spouses have been living separate and apart continuously
for the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, or more on the
date the petition is filed.”), and LA. CIV. CODE art. 103.1 (2014) (“The requisite
periods of time . . . shall be as follows: (1) One hundred eighty days where there
are no minor children of the marriage. (2) Three hundred sixty-five days when
there are minor children of the marriage . . . .”), and 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
15-5-3(a) (West 2013) (“Whenever, in the trial of any complaint for divorce from
the bond of marriage or any complaint for dissolution of a marriage, it shall be
alleged in the complaint that the parties have lived separate and apart from each
other for the space of at least three (3) years . . . .”).
113. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“So when a
court of one state acting in accord with the requirements of procedural due process
alters the marital status of one domiciled in that state by granting him a divorce
from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be excepted from the full
faith and credit clause merely because its enforcement or recognition in another
state would conflict with the policy of the latter.”).
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that such an individual could subjectively believe that her divorce and
remarriage would be valid114 much less that a reasonable person would
believe them valid,115 whereas other courts might accept that she sincerely
believed the divorce and remarriage valid if she were inexperienced or
naive116 but might nonetheless reject that a reasonable person would
believe these valid. Or, a court might find that individuals might
reasonably and sincerely believe such a Mexican divorce valid, enabling
them to marry.117
D. Presumptions of Good Faith
At least in part because there seems to be so much variation when
applying the applicable sincerity standard, some states employ a
presumption of good faith,118 which imposes a burden on the challenging
114. Miller v. Johnson, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1963) (“The trial court
found plaintiff neither believed in good faith she was validly married to
decedent . . . .”).
115. Id. (“But there must also be a diligent attempt to meet the requisites of a
valid marriage [citing Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 3 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1931)]. The
trial court found plaintiff . . . had [not] made any diligent attempt to meet the
requisites of a valid marriage.”).
116. See In re Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357, 363 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1984) (“It must be remembered that Elizabeth was a young girl living in a
small, rural community. In this particular set of facts, it is the opinion of this court
that Elizabeth had an honest and reasonable belief her marriage was valid and that
no legal impediment existed to her marriage.”), writ denied sub nom. Succession
of Gordon, 464 So. 2d 319 (La. 1985). But see Rebouche v. Anderson, 505 So. 2d
808 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court finding that a woman with
a sixth grade education and a mental age of twelve did not have the requisite good
faith to qualify as a putative spouse); see also Blakesley, supra note 7, at 20–21
(“Intelligence, experience, education, maturity, and linguistic capability are
among the characteristics which are important to the issue of whether a person
does or does not have a good faith belief that a void marriage is valid. Thus, if the
putative spouse is young, naive, and unsophisticated, mere rumor of an
impediment may not be sufficient to trigger a duty to investigate or to place that
person in the status of bad faith.”).
117. See Dean v. Goldwire, 480 S.W.2d 494, 496–97 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972)
(writ refused n.r.e. Oct. 4, 1972) (“We hold that if either appellee or appellant
believed in good faith that she had obtained a valid Mexican divorce from Dean
and that she was therefore legally free to marry appellee at the time of their
marriage, then the marriage was putative and remained such until they [b]oth
learned that she was not divorced from Dean.”).
118. Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (Nev. 2004) (“Good faith is
presumed.”).
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party to show the lack of a good faith belief in the validity of the
marriage.119 The existence of rumors about another spouse or a suspicion
that there might be someone else is insufficient to establish the lack of a
good faith belief in the validity of the marriage.120 A Louisiana appellate
court explained: “The ‘good faith’ required . . . is only that the party
should have no certain knowledge of any impediment to the marriage and
should have an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid
and that no legal impediment existed at the time of its confection.”121
The presumption of good faith is not triggered in all cases. Some states
distinguish between the individual who cannot remarry currently122 and
the individual who can, presuming good faith on the part of the latter but
not the former.123 If the party with the impediment claims to be a putative
spouse, she or he has the burden of proving his good faith, whereas
otherwise the one attacking the sincerity of the belief has the burden of
proving the absence of good faith.124
119. Id. (“The party asserting lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad
faith.”); see also Brown v. Brown, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238, 243 (Ct. App. 1969)
(“[W]hen the trial judge found that Charlotte did not act in good faith when she
married Ralph, he did so contrary to the rule that it is presumed that persons who
participate in marriage ceremonies do so in good faith and that ‘he who would
assert “bad faith” should be able to point to some evidence proving or tending to
prove’ it.”) (citing Krizman v. Industrial Acc. Com., 58 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App.
1936)).
120. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1128 (“Unconfirmed rumors or mere suspicions of a
legal impediment do not vitiate good faith.”); Freet v. Freet, 442 So. 2d 1366,
1368 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (“The facts show that Jane knew of the existence
of her husband’s prior marriage, but that fact does not prevent her from being in
good faith simply because she does not conduct an independent investigation into
the prior relationship.”) (citing Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1978)).
121. Succession of Jene, 173 So. 2d 857, 860 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965)
(citing Succession of Fields, 62 So. 2d 495 (La. 1952)).
122. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 23 (“The presumption of good faith, however,
is generally denied to the party who has the impediment of a pre-existing valid
marriage in his or her background.”).
123. Id. (“[G]ood faith is presumed to exist in favor of a party claiming to be
a putative spouse who, free of [his or] her own impediment, enters into the
marriage and the burden of proving the lack of good faith is upon the party
attacking the marriage.”) (citing Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587, 592 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ denied, 363 So. 2d 72 (La. 1978)).
124. Jene, 173 So. 2d at 861; see also Zinsel, 360 So. 2d at 592 (citing
Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860 (La. 1947)) (“[T]his good faith is presumed
to exist in favor of a party claiming to be a putative spouse who, free of her own
impediment, enters into the marriage and the burden of proving the lack of good
faith is upon the party attacking the marriage.”).
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The presumption is rebuttable, and the individual challenging putative
spouse status might overcome the presumption by showing that the person
claiming good faith knew that the would-be marital partner was barred
from marrying because the latter’s divorce was not final.125 So, too, the
person subject to the impediment might be able to establish good faith by
producing a document that would lead one to believe that the divorce was
final or, perhaps, by showing that he acted in ways supporting that he
believed in the validity of his divorce.126
It is not difficult to imagine why such a presumption might be created.
Individuals might not even know that their “spouses” had ever married
before, so those persons would be reasonably presumed to be marrying in
good faith.127 If individuals know that they were once married, then it
125. Daniels v. Ret. Bd. of Policeman’s Annuity & Ben. Fund, 435 N.E.2d
1276, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (“[T]he evidence discloses that she knew deceased
and defendant had not been divorced and was thus aware that the marriage
between her and the deceased was not legal. . . . In light of plaintiff’s knowledge
that she was not legally married, she did not acquire putative spouse status . . . .”).
126. See In re Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357, 363–64 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1984), writ denied sub nom. Succession of Gordon, 464 So. 2d 319 (La. 1985)
(“The testimony established decedent was a hard-working, honest and religious
man who objected to cohabitation. . . . [D]ecedent married Elizabeth in the same
small community and eventually settled there. Decedent did not conceal his prior
marriage with Emma when he and Elizabeth applied for their marriage license.
Rather, he declared he was divorced from ‘Emma Gordon.’ His wedding was
attended by Emma's brother . . . . The course of decedent’s conduct, particularly
in remaining in the community after his marriage to Elizabeth to raise his family,
evidences that he believed he was divorced. Decedent’s good faith is further
evidenced by his actions in 1969 when he was informed he was not divorced from
Emma. Linda Gordon Mims testified decedent appeared upset and displayed an
old paper which he indicated to be his ‘divorce papers’. Decedent consulted an
attorney and later initiated divorce proceedings in Arizona.”); Ceja v. Rudolph &
Sletten Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 214 (Cal. 2013) (“Following their well-attended
marriage ceremony, plaintiff held herself out as decedent’s wife ‘to all persons at
all times.’ She changed her last name to Ceja, and the two of them wore wedding
rings, shared a joint checking account, lived together in the same house as husband
and wife, and handled their taxes as married but filing separately. Plaintiff would
not have had her wedding on September 27, 2003, had she not believed she would
have a legal and valid marriage to decedent. Had she realized at any time that her
marriage was invalid, she and decedent ‘would have simply redone the
ceremony.’”).
127. See Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 712–13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) (writ
refused n.r.e. Apr. 1, 1970) (“Since Arcelia Lucius Caruso was innocent of
knowledge of the pre-existing marriage, she was not a meretricious spouse, but
was a putative spouse . . . .”); cf. Succession of Hopkins, 114 So. 2d 742, 744 (La.
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might be thought that they should bear some responsibility to make sure
that they actually obtained a divorce.128
Yet, matters may not be so simple. If an individual who was married
should be held responsible for making sure that the first marriage ended in
divorce, the same argument might be made with respect to the individual
who knows that her (soon-to-be) spouse was previously married.129
Further, where there is no reason for the previously married person to
believe that there was a defect in the divorce,130 there would seem to be no
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959) (suggesting that good faith in this context is “an honest
and reasonable belief that the marriage is valid, and that no legal impediment
thereto exists”).
128. See Cardwell v. Cardwell, 195 S.W.3d 856, 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
(“[W]ife testified that after she left Gay in 1986, she did nothing to initiate divorce
proceedings. She testified further that Gay told her he was taking care of the
divorce, but she admitted she did nothing to determine whether Gay had done
so.”). Sometimes, a party does not reveal all of his spouses. See In re Est. of
Williams, 417 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“Betty testified when she
married decedent it was her understanding that decedent had been married only
once previously and that his former wife, Estelle, had died. Betty’s marriage
certificate supported her claim. It indicated only one previous marriage for
decedent. The probate court found that Betty entered into marriage in good faith
without knowledge of decedent’s first and second marriages and without
knowledge that decedent had not divorced his previous wives.”).
129. See Funderburk v. Funderburk, 38 So. 2d 502, 504 (La. 1949) (“[T]he
mere assertion by the man to the woman that he has secured a divorce from his
wife whom she knows he is married to is not sufficient in itself to create a
presumption of good faith on her part . . . .”); Est. of Hite, No. 09-98-349 CV,
1999 WL 278898, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. May 6, 1999) (“[A]t some point Janis
became aware of the existence of the lawful marriage between the decedent and
Dorothy. . . . This . . . placed Janis on notice that her capacity to act as a surviving
spouse was an issue. As such, it became her responsibility to prove that the legal
impediment to the establishment of a valid informal marriage to the decedent had
been removed sometime before his death.”).
130. See, e.g., Hart v. Hart, 427 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
(“The trial court specifically found that Mrs. Hart, as a lay person, was reasonable
in relying on her attorney to [affect her] divorce. . . .There is nothing in the record
to indicate any knowledge on her part of the infirmity in that divorce.”); see also
Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329, 332–33 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (“Since
Gaudin’s marriage to Mara was annulled on the ground that her previous marriage
to Buglione was never dissolved, appellant now assumes the burden to prove her
good faith in marrying Mara . . . . [T]he Alabama lawyer had defrauded her into
believing in the validity of the divorce judgment which he had issued to her, and
that she was an easy mark for his trickery and deceit, having only a high school
education and no knowledge of divorce law.”).
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reason to impose a greater burden on that individual than on the individual
who was not impeded from marrying.
The state use of a presumption of good faith makes sense in certain
cases, because that may well aid the trier of fact to make a decision about
the sincerity of the person claiming to be a putative spouse. However, it is
not at all clear that this should simply be based on which individual was
precluded from marrying because of some (possibly unknown)
impediment. In some cases, the parties would seem to be in the same
position with respect to whether they should be presumed to be in good
faith, regardless of which party happens to be precluded currently from
remarrying. While employing a presumption of good faith in certain cases
makes sense, states should refine when that presumption is triggered.
E. Asset Distribution When the Relationship Ends
As a general matter, when a putative marriage ends, a court may
distribute the property acquired during the relationship as the property
would have been distributed had the parties had a valid marriage.131
Sometimes, the authorization to distribute property that way is provided
by statute.132 At other times where putative marriage has been recognized
131. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 69 P.2d 845, 847 (Cal. 1937) (“Where a
‘putative’ marriage has existed, that is, where one or both parties to an invalid
marriage have in good faith believed such marriage to be valid, upon an annulment
or declaration of invalidity the courts will recognize the right of the de facto wife
in property acquired by the parties through their joint efforts, and which would
have been community property had the marriage been valid, and will make an
equitable division of such property.”).
In Re Krone’s Est, 189 P.2d 741, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (“[U]pon the
dissolution of a putative marriage by decree of annulment or by death the wife is
to take the same share to which she would have been entitled as a legal spouse.”);
Rupert v. Rupert, No. 54854, 2010 WL 3528611, at *1 (Nev. July 20, 2010)
(“When applying the putative spouse doctrine, the district court may divide the
parties’ property according to community property principles.”). But see Wallace,
supra note 3, at 102 (“Idaho recognizes the putative spouse’s right to bring a
wrongful death action, but at the death of the common spouse, gives no other
effects to a putative spouse.”) (citing Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129
(Nev. 2004)).
132. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (West 2020)
Any person who has cohabited with another to whom the person is not
legally married in the good faith belief that the person was married to the
other is a putative spouse until knowledge of the fact that the person is
not legally married terminates the status and prevents acquisition of
further rights. A putative spouse acquires the rights conferred upon a
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through the case law and not through statute,133 the statutes governing the
distribution of property upon the ending of a marriage will be viewed as
instructive134 rather than as controlling,135 because a putative marriage is
not in fact a marriage, so the relevant statutes would not expressly apply.136

legal spouse, including the right to maintenance following termination
of the status, whether or not the marriage is prohibited or declared a
nullity. If there is a legal spouse or other putative spouses, rights acquired
by a putative spouse do not supersede the rights of the legal spouse or
those acquired by other putative spouses, but the court shall apportion
property, maintenance, and support rights among the claimants as
appropriate in the circumstances and in the interests of justice.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2020)
If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, the court shall:
(1) Declare the party or parties, who believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, to have the status of a putative spouse. (2) If the
division of property is in issue, divide, in accordance with Division 7
(commencing with Section 2500), that property acquired during the
union that would have been community property or quasi-community
property if the union had not been void or voidable, only upon request of
a party who is declared a putative spouse under paragraph (1).
133. Sometimes, putative status is first recognized through the courts and then
subsequently via statute. See Sanguinetti, 69 P.2d at 847 (“Where a ‘putative’
marriage has existed, that is, where one or both parties to an invalid marriage have
in good faith believed such marriage to be valid, upon an annulment or declaration
of invalidity the courts will recognize the right of the de facto wife in property
acquired by the parties through their joint efforts, and which would have been
community property had the marriage been valid, and will make an equitable
division of such property.”); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 (Cal.
1976) (“Prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act, no statute granted rights to
a putative spouse.”).
134. Turknette v. Turknette, 223 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (“In such
cases the courts look to the statutes dealing with divorce, annulment or separate
maintenance not as a source of power, but as furnishing a standard to be used by
way of analogy.”).
135. See id.
136. See Weaver v. State, 855 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“With
the exception of equity, putative marriages have never been given the same
credence as ceremonial or common law marriages for the very reason that they
are putative: there exists some impediment to the marriage. There can be no legal
marriage if there is a barrier.”); Wallace, supra note 3, at 96 (“Equity, not the laws
of community property, govern the division, even though the result under either
theory likely will be the same.”).
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When determining what putative spouses should receive, courts
reason that the putative spouse should be treated as well as the legal spouse
would have been treated, because the putative spouse sincerely and
reasonably believed that she was married to her spouse.137 Such a rationale
is quite persuasive if, for example, a couple mistakenly138 participated in
their marriage ceremony one day before one party’s divorce was final.139
There would be no other parties (other than the soon-to-be divorced spouse
who might still have a small window during which she could appeal the
divorce)140 who might in good faith have expected to be treated as a
spouse. But a more difficult scenario arises when there is both a legal
spouse and a putative spouse at the time the putative marriage ends.141
One California appellate court reasoned that in such cases:
[T]he claim of a putative spouse must be limited to property
acquired during the continuance of that relationship. It seems
obvious that one-half of the property in question belongs to the
putative spouse. The other half belongs to the legal community
(husband and legally recognized spouse) and should be distributed
as any other community property under the same

137. Cf. Brennfleck v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 84 Cal. Rptr. 50, 53 (Ct.
App. 1970) (“Logically, there does not seem to be any good reason why a putative
spouse who believes that she is married and who lives with the putative husband,
taking care of his household and him just as a legal wife would do, should not
receive the same death benefits as a legal wife would. There is a fundamental
unfairness in treating such a putative wife who has reason to believe and in good
faith believes that she is the workmen's wife, as does he, differently from a legal
wife.”).
138. Galbraith v. Galbraith, 396 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981)
(“The trial court specifically found both plaintiff and defendant to be in good
faith . . . .”).
139. See id. at 1367–68.
140. See id. at 1368 (“Plaintiff’s former wife could have appealed the
judgment of divorce after the purported marriage between plaintiff and defendant
since the delays for appealing would not begin to run until after the divorce
judgment was signed.”).
141. See Est. of Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 1974) (“For 24 years
Juan Vargas lived a double life as husband and father to two separate families,
neither of which knew of the other’s existence.”); In re Marriage of Himes, 965
P.2d 1087, 1101 (Wash. 1998) (“If the putative spouse has valid interests, such as
rights to property jointly accumulated during the putative marriage, then the trial
court must shape and balance the relief to protect the interests of both the putative
spouse and the legal spouse.”).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 158

5/26/21 11:50 AM

2021]

FAIRNESS AND THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE

1267

circumstances.142
Here, the trial court awarded half of the property to the putative spouse
and half to the legal spouse,143 a distribution that was affirmed on
appeal.144
Yet, at least as a general matter, it is not obvious that this is a sensible
distribution rule. Consider what happens in a case where there is a legal
spouse and a putative spouse, and the husband dies leaving his property to
the putative spouse. The putative spouse would receive three quarters of
the property (the putative spouse’s half plus one half of the deceased’s
share), with the legal spouse receiving only one quarter (one half of the
deceased’s share).145 Yet, even if the state has decided that the putative
spouse should not be placed in a less advantageous position than a legal
spouse, that does not mean that the putative spouse should be in a more
advantageous position than a legal spouse.146 To avoid the legal spouse
being placed in a less advantageous position than the putative spouse,
some jurisdictions require that the property acquired during the putative
marriage be split evenly between the legal spouse and the putative
spouse.147
142. In re Ricci’s Est., 19 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740 (Ct. App. 1962) (quoting with
approval Professor Burby (Professor of Law, University of Southern California)
in Family Law for California Lawyers, pages 359–360); see also Caruso v.
Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711, 712–13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) (“Since Arcelia Lucius
Caruso was innocent of knowledge of the pre-existing marriage, she was not a
meretricious spouse, but was a putative spouse, and entitled to one-half of the
‘community’ properties acquired by herself and Pasquale Caruso during their
marriage relationship. Appellant’s claims, therefore, were to one-half of Pasquale
Caruso’s one-half of the properties in question, plus the net income from those
properties since the date of Pasquale Caruso's death on July 19, 1966.”).
143. Ricci’s Est., 19 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
144. Id. (“The decree appealed from is affirmed.”).
145. See Sousa v. Freitas, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 (Ct. App. 1970) (“Under this
analysis by the recognized expert in community property law, Catherine is entitled
to one-half of the property in her own right; plus the half of the community
property decedent was entitled to devise, or another one-quarter of the whole; and
the plaintiff is entitled to one-quarter of the whole estate only.”); Blache v. Blache,
160 P.2d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945); see also In re Est. of Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr.
41, 48 (Ct. App. 1975) (citing Sousa, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 with approval).
146. Galbraith v. Galbraith, 396 So. 2d 1364, 1370 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981)
(“[A] putative spouse should not be placed in a more advantageous position than
a divorced spouse of a valid marriage.”).
147. See Price v. Price, 326 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (“The
law is settled that when a man contracts a second marriage while his first wife is
living and undivorced, and dies leaving community property acquired during the
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Two different scenarios might be envisioned, and the intuitions about
which distribution would be fairer might depend upon which distribution
one had in mind. In one, the legal spouses never divorced because of some
technicality but thereafter lived separate lives, and one of the spouses
entered into a putative marriage.148 In the second scenario, the husband
maintains relations with both his legal spouse and his putative spouse.149
In the latter case, it is difficult to justify giving three-fourths or all of the
estate to either wife,150 at least as a matter of fairness.151 Instead, an equal
division would seem wisest.152 In the former case, especially if there were
some law specifying that property acquired would be only divided insofar
as the couple was living as a community,153 then there would be
justification for not giving the legal spouse a share of the property that had
been acquired while the couple had been living separate and apart.154
second marriage, contracted in good faith, the estate will be divided equally by
the two wives.”) (citing inter alia Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956)).
148. See, e.g., Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128, 130 (La. 1956) (marriage never
dissolved, although husband and wife both believed that they had divorced and
each subsequently remarried).
149. Est. of Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 1974) (“For 24 years Juan
Vargas lived a double life as husband and father to two separate families, neither
of which knew of the other’s existence. This terrestial [sic] paradise came to an
end in 1969 when Juan died intestate in an automobile accident.”).
150. Id. at 781 (“In the present case, depending on which statute or legal theory
is applied, both Mildred, as legal spouse, and Josephine, as putative spouse, have
valid or plausible claims to at least half, perhaps three-quarters, possibly all, of
Juan’s estate.”).
151. See id. (“The court found that both wives contributed in indeterminable
amounts and proportions to the accumulations of the community.”).
152. Id. (“[T]he probate court cut the Gordian knot of competing claims and
divided the estate equally between the two wives, presumably on the theory that
innocent wives of practicing bigamists are entitled to equal shares of property
accumulated during the active phase of the bigamy. . . . [T]he wisdom of Solomon
is not required to perceive the justice of the result.”).
153. Seizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 261, 264 (Wash. 1997) (“In Washington,
when a husband and wife live separate and apart, their marriage may be defunct,
and, under RCW 26.16.140, all earnings and accumulations are the acquiring
spouse’s separate property. The statute contemplates permanent separation of the
parties—a defunct marriage.”) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993,
995–96 (Wash. 1988)).
154. See Patillo v. Norris, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (Ct. App. 1976) (“Here
David lived with each wife only after he had separated from the other. The
community property claims of each wife thus did not actually overlap; they
merely applied to different time periods in David's life.”). But see In re Succession
of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357, 365 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (“However, as
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Sometimes, the legal spouse is abandoned, and the abandoning spouse
begins a new relationship with someone else. While in one sense the
property acquired during the second relationship is a product of the efforts
of the abandoner and the putative spouse, the legal spouse may continue
to contribute to the assets acquired during the putative marriage. For
example, the legal spouse may care for children from the marriage after
receiving no help from the abandoning spouse, and fairness might require
that the legal spouse receive more than half of the abandoning spouse’s
share of the assets acquired while with the putative spouse.155
F. How Should the Non-Putative Spouse Be Treated?
When a putative marriage ends, at least one of the parties must have
sincerely believed in the validity of the marriage. Sometimes, both parties
to the putative marriage are putative spouses because they both sincerely
believed in the validity of the marriage. For example, if both parties
reasonably relied on the divorce that one of the parties allegedly obtained,
both parties would be putative spouses. In that event, there is no reason to
treat the parties differently as a matter of fairness.
Suppose, however, that one of the spouses knows that the marriage
was never valid because he knows that he never divorced his first wife.
Courts and legislatures distinguish between the rights of the spouse who
sincerely believed in the validity of the marriage and the spouse who did
not.
In Allen v. Allen,156 the plaintiff wished to take advantage of the
putative spouse doctrine, notwithstanding his “failure to acknowledge his
prior marriage on the marriage license, his failure to identify the date his
‘divorce’ became final, and his admission that he was married at the time
of the second marriage.”157 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
evidence of his bad faith “preclude[d] the application of the putative

decedent’s first marriage was not dissolved . . . . In other words, the legal and
putative community were in co-existence.”).
155. See Est. of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 688 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[E]very
court which has considered the issue of succession to a decedent's intestate estate,
as between a surviving legal spouse and a surviving putative spouse, has awarded
one-half of the quasi-marital property to the putative spouse and the other half to
the legal spouse, or spouse and children . . . .”).
156. Allen v. Allen, 703 A.2d 1115 (R.I. 1997).
157. Id. at 1116.
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spouse doctrine.”158 Basically, the marriage was void ab initio,159 and
neither individual was entitled to the other’s property.160
In Allen, the putative spouse did not wish to invoke the doctrine, and
the non-innocent spouse was not permitted to invoke it. However, not all
courts have precluded the non-putative spouse from invoking the putative
spouse’s status and thereby benefitting.
In In re Marriage of Tejeda,161 a California appellate court explained
that “even where only one party has the requisite good faith belief in the
validity of the marriage, thereby qualifying as the sole putative spouse, the
court’s declaration of his or her status operates as a declaration that the
union itself is a putative marriage.”162 The court reasoned that when the
putative marriage ends, the property acquired during the relationship must
be distributed, and the spouse who knew that the marriage was invalid is
also entitled to a share of that property.163 Refusing to permit the nonputative spouse from benefiting would in effect punish the guilty person,
but “[d]isregarding guilt and innocence in property division . . . support[s]
the purposes of the Family Law Act.”164
While the California Legislature eschewed considering guilt and
innocence in property divisions at the end of marriages, the legislature did
not adopt a similar nonjudgmental approach in the putative-marriage
context. For example, the Family Law Act rejected use of fault in the
context of spousal support,165 but “the Legislature singled out . . . the
‘putative spouse’ in providing for support.”166 Nonetheless, the Tejeda
158. Id.
159. Id. (“[W]e affirm the judgment that the marriage was void ab
initio . . . .”).
160. Id. (“[A]lthough plaintiff is not entitled to any assets or any portion of
any assets owned individually by defendant, including but not limited to
defendant's pension plan or any future monetary award resulting from any pending
litigation involving defendant, plaintiff does retain rights to all assets he owned
individually prior to or during the void marriage.”).
161. In re Marriage of Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361 (Ct. App. 2009).
162. Id. at 368.
163. Id. at 369 (discussing the equal division of the quasi-marital property).
164. Id.
165. See In re Marriage of Morrison, 573 P.2d 41, 49 (Cal. 1978) (“The major
differences between former section 139 and the new section were that the new
section eliminated consideration of the comparative marital fault of the parties in
setting support . . . .”).
166. Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 369; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 2254 (West
2020) (“The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding for nullity of
marriage or upon judgment of nullity of marriage, order a party to pay for the
support of the other party in the same manner as if the marriage had not been void
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court was correct when it stated that the legislature “did not limit quasimarital property division to an innocent putative spouse, either explicitly
or implicitly.”167 As an additional consideration, the legislature
presumably “was aware of the substantial body of decisional law
providing for equal division of quasi-marital property,”168 and one would
have expected the legislature to expressly indicate that property was to be
distributed in a different way if that had been the legislative intent.169
In In re Marriage of Guo & Sun,170 a California appellate court
disagreed with the Tejeda analysis, reasoning that “[t]he purpose of the
doctrine is to protect the ‘innocent’ party or parties of an invalid marriage
from losing community property rights.”171 The Guo & Sun court then
reasoned:
Having determined that the purpose of section 2251 is to protect
innocent parties of an invalid marriage from losing community
property rights, we disagree with the holding in Tejeda. If Tejeda
were correct, then a party who fraudulently and in bad faith
conceals his or her bigamy can reap the benefits of putative spouse
status even when his or her innocent spouse does not contend that
there was a putative marriage. This result is inconsistent with the
equitable principles underlying section 2251.172
A few different issues should be distinguished. One involves how
property should be distributed when a putative marriage ends. The Tejeda
or voidable if the party for whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative
spouse.”).
167. Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 369.
168. Id.
169. Other jurisdictions have rejected that a party must have evinced good
faith in order to benefit in the property distribution. See Cotton v. Cotton, 44 So.
3d 371, 377 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (“Because we find that good faith is not
required under Mississippi law to support an equitable distribution of property
acquired during a void marriage, this issue is without merit.”).
170. In re Marriage of Guo & Sun, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906 (Ct. App. 2010),
disapproved of on other grounds by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211
(Cal. 2013).
171. Id. at 910 (citing Schneider v. Schneider, 191 P. 533, 534–535 (Cal.
1920)); see also Schneider v. Schneider, 191 P. 533, 534 (Cal. 1920) (“In four of
the seven states where the community rule as to property of the character here
considered prevails it has been held that where a woman is an innocent party to a
void marriage she is entitled to the same interest in property acquired by the
parties as if the marriage were valid.”).
172. Guo & Sun, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914.
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court correctly explained that the non-putative spouse should receive his
or her share of the quasi-marital property at the end of a putative
marriage.173 A different issue involves whether the “spouse” who knew all
along that the marriage was void can nonetheless assert that there was a
putative marriage merely because the other spouse sincerely believed in
the marriage’s validity. Still another issue is whether the property must be
distributed as if there was a valid marriage when the only party seeking
such a distribution is the individual who knew all along that the marriage
was void.
In Tejeda, the “innocent” spouse did not assert putative spouse status
for herself.174 One of the Guo & Sun court’s points was that the individual
who knew that the marriage was invalid should not be permitted to invoke
putative-marriage status by claiming that the other party sincerely believed
in the validity of the marriage.175 Permitting the deceitful party to do so
permits that individual to take advantage of the other party twice: once
when pretending to enter into a marriage that he or she knew was void and
again when seeking to benefit from the distribution of quasi-marital
property.
There are at least two ways to avoid the difficulty highlighted by the
Guo & Sun court. One might adopt the Allen approach176 and preclude the
individual who knew that the marriage was void ab initio from asserting
the putative marriage status. Or, one might permit a court to find that there
was a putative marriage based on the relevant testimony,177 but make it
part of the law that only the putative spouse can trigger the provision
requiring that the property be distributed as if the couple had married.178
173. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251(a)(2) (West 2020).
174. In re Marriage of Tejeda, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 364 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Petra clarified that she was not seeking putative spouse status for herself.”).
175. Cf. Guo & Sun, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910 (“The purpose of the doctrine is
to protect the ‘innocent’ party or parties of an invalid marriage from losing
community property rights.”).
176. See supra notes 155–60.
177. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251(a)(1) (West 2020)
If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, the court shall:
Declare the party or parties, who believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, to have the status of a putative spouse.
178. See id. § 2251(a)(2)
If the division of property is in issue, divide, in accordance with Division
7 (commencing with Section 2500), that property acquired during the
union that would have been community property or quasi-community
property if the union had not been void or voidable, only upon request of
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A few points might be made about requiring the putative spouse’s
consent before the property will be distributed as it would have been had
the couple had a valid marriage. First, both spouses might be putative
spouses because both had believed the marriage valid. In that event, either
party could ask that the property acquired during the relationship be
distributed as if the marriage had been valid. Second, once the putative
spouse requests that the property be distributed as it would have been had
the couple had a valid marriage, the property will be split in light of local
law, which may mean that fault will play no role in the property allocation.
CONCLUSION
States recognize putative spouse status to promote fairness and
prevent unjust enrichment so that individuals who in good faith believed
that their marriages were valid will have some protection when those
relationships end. However, states have very different policies about what
the putative spouse may receive, which means that such spouses may be
sorely disappointed when their relationships end, justified expectations
notwithstanding. Yet, it is also true that in the quest to put putative spouses
on an equal footing with legal spouses, some states seem to favor the
putative spouse over the legal spouse, a result that in some cases will
undermine fairness and justified expectations.
States differ about the standard to be used when deciding whether a
putative spouse sincerely believed the marriage valid. On the one hand,
use of a reasonable person standard may exclude too many from that status
merely because of naivety or a lack of education. On the other hand, states
do not seem to appreciate just how open-ended the subjective standard
might be. An individual might sincerely believe that he or she is married
to someone else, where the latter person sincerely believes that the two do
not have a relationship at all much less a marital relationship.
The subjective test incorporates reasonableness, so the trier of fact will
ask whether it is credible that the individual sincerely believed that he or
she was in a valid marriage, but this reasonableness limitation will not
provide as much of a check as might be thought. Instead, the trier of fact
will either have to recognize putative spouse status in surprising cases or
will have to reject that the person has that status, even though all of the
indicia of sincerity have been met to the degree that has proven sufficient
in other cases. What may well happen is that the trier of act will permit
other kinds of considerations into the assessment of sincerity, e.g., whether
a party who is declared a putative spouse under paragraph (1). This
property is known as “quasi-marital property.”
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the would-be putative spouse is likable or perhaps of the “correct” class
however that might be defined, and make that judgment almost immune
to reversal on appeal.
Some states require that certain conditions be met before assessing
whether an individual subjectively believes in the validity of the marriage.
Such a position is likely both over- and underinclusive—it may exclude
the naive or uneducated who do not know which formal requirements must
be met but include those who, after having met the formal requirements,
have willfully blinded themselves to signs that their marriage is invalid
and that would have been too obvious for a reasonable person to ignore.
At the very least, states should be honest that their policy is a kind of
compromise meant to promote various goals, so the results might well
appear to be both under- and overinclusive when examined in light of only
one of the state’s articulated goals.
States can use presumptions about good faith to help the trier of fact
assess who should be considered a putative spouse. However, the current
approach may overemphasize who happens to be impeded from marrying
rather than other factors more closely related to whether individual beliefs
are sincere.
One of the difficulties in figuring out the fair resolution of these kinds
of cases is that there may be many innocent parties, especially when one
considers children and other family members, and giving one person his
or her due may result in another worthy individual receiving less than
might reasonably have been expected. The situation is further complicated
because of differences in the states about other domestic relations matters,
e.g., differing policies about whether to recognize common-law marriage
at all or the conditions under which such marriages will be recognized. By
the same token, differing state policies about when the removal of an
impediment will validate a marriage can only multiply the number and
kinds of cases where individuals thought their marriages valid, provisions
of local law notwithstanding.
State courts and legislatures must provide much more guidance about
who qualifies as a putative spouse. Otherwise, some individuals who seem
to meet the relevant criteria will continue to be excluded, and others who
seem not to meet the relevant criteria will nonetheless be included. Such
an approach is unfair not only because of its inconsistency but also because
of the implications that these decisions have for other interested parties.
States can and must do better.

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 166

5/26/21 11:50 AM

